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FONDATION POUR L'INNOVATION POLITIQUE fondapol.org

## Radiography of anti-Semitism in 2024

In 2023, the Jewish Community Protection Service (SPCJ) and the French Ministry of the Interior recorded 1,676 anti-Semitic acts. Nearly 60% of these were directed against individuals, and most often took the form of threatening gestures and words. Between January and September 2023, the SPCJ and the Ministry of the Interior recorded an average of around 40 acts per month. From October 7, the day of the Hamas attack on Israeli territory, this figure exploded, with an increase of over 1000%. It's a constant: media coverage of an extremely serious anti-Semitic event acts as a catalyst, almost systematically triggering an upsurge in manifestations of anti-Jewish hatred. The SPCJ noted that the attack on the Ozar Hatorah Jewish school in Toulouse was accompanied by a 200% increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts reported. The same phenomenon was also observed after the Hypercasher attack. While this dynamic is not new, it has taken on unprecedented proportions since October 7.

The Hamas massacre sent shockwaves through Jewish communities around the world and through Western public opinion. The sheer number of victims in relation to the country's population, the fact that the majority were civilians - often women and children - and the nature of the atrocities committed probably explain the horror felt. By describing the attack as a "pogrom", Jewish communities associate it with the tragedies of the twentieth century. In France, the repercussions of the attack were particularly notable. In addition to the horror of discovering that even the Jewish State was not an infallible bulwark against anti-Semitism, French Jews were worried about their loved ones in Israel. The attachment of French Jews to the Hebrew state must be understood not only in terms of the country's perception as a refuge from persecution, but also in terms of the many family and cultural ties between the two states.

Since October 7, French Jews have been living through a particularly trying period. On top of the pain caused by the Hamas atrocities, there has been an upsurge in anti-Semitic acts in France. Although a number of media reports have highlighted this difficult situation, no specific quantitative analysis has yet been undertaken to systematically assess its impact.

The American Jewish Comittee (AJC), the Fondation pour l'innovation Politique (Fondapol) and the French public opinion institute (IFOP) have been collaborating since 2014 on studies designed to better understand the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. This new study is part of an X-ray conducted since 2019. In this respect, this 2024 edition continues this effort with a resolutely barometric approach. While the methodology used has been renewed, on a like-for-like basis, in order to measure changes, it has also been continually enriched. Of particular note this year is the inclusion of a digital component produced by Deep Opinion, a subsidiary of the IFOP group dedicated to social network analysis.

The proliferation of anti-Semitic acts in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas has revived an old debate: is anti-Zionism anti-Semitism? While for some the answer to this question is obvious, in reality the debate seems particularly complex. First of all, while in theory anti-Zionism refers to opposition to the existence of a Jewish nation-state, the term has undergone a semantic shift and is often used to qualify a discourse that is ultra-critical of Israel. Secondly, there is an area of ambiguity between the legitimate expression of criticism of the policies of the Hebrew state and the adoption of violent behavior towards Jewish people, under the guise of radical anti-Zionism. Finally, we feel it is important to recognize the highly subjective nature of this debate. This study does not claim to provide definitive answers to this question, but rather seeks to shed light on how current tensions influence the spread of anti-Semitic ideas within the French population, and to examine the repercussions of these dynamics on the daily lives of French citizens of the Jewish faith. We hope that these data will contribute to the ongoing debate and encourage further reflection on these issues.

- Assess the perception of anti-Semitism among the French: examine how the French, in general, and Jewish French, in particular, perceive anti-Semitism, and identify changes in this perception since the 2019 survey.
- Analyze the prevalence of anti-Semitic ideas in France: investigate the extent of anti-Semitic ideas in the French population and explore the influence of the current context on their spread.
- **Identify groups with a high incidence of anti-Semitic ideas:** objectify and quantify the over-representation of anti-Semitic ideas in certain segments of the French population.
- Measuring the spread of anti-Semitic ideas on social networks: assess the frequency and distribution of anti-Semitic ideas expressed on social networking platforms.
- **Quantify anti-Semitic acts independently of complaints filed:** measure the actual prevalence of anti-Semitic acts, going beyond statistics based solely on complaints filed.
- Understand the impact of the current context on French Jews: explore how current conditions affect the daily lives of French Jews.

### **Methodological choices**

A particularly ambitious methodological approach was adopted. Three quantitative surveys were carried out more or less simultaneously via the Internet between February 12 and March 22, 2024.

The first survey was carried out on a sample of 2003 respondents, representative of the French population aged 18 and over. It focused on their perception of anti-Semitism and their adherence to anti-Semitic ideas. The large sample size enabled precise analysis according to various respondent characteristics, including socio-demographic as well as economic and ideological variables.

The second survey was conducted among 527 Muslims living in France. It is important to emphasize that, in line with standard practice in France, all opinion surveys are based on the resident population. Within this population, the proportion of people of foreign nationality remains in the minority, which justifies the widespread use of the expression "Muslims".

The term "les Français" also includes a small proportion of foreigners. However, within the Muslim population in France, the proportion of people of foreign nationality is significantly higher. For this reason, in analyzing the results of this survey, we will refer to "people of the Muslim faith living in France", in recognition of this demographic particularity.

The third survey polled 500 French people of Jewish faith or culture to assess their exposure to anti-Semitic acts, their perception of these acts, and the impact of the October 7 event on their daily lives. Although it is complex to guarantee a perfect representation of this population in France, we believe that our sample captures its nuances fairly faithfully. In particular, 51% of those surveyed were churchgoers, while 49% said they were churchgoers or not at all. The composition of the sample also shows gender parity (51% men and 49% women) and an age distribution similar to that of the general French population. It also makes it possible to analyze results according to people's origin (Sephardic, Ashkenazi or both).

In addition to the three quantitative surveys, we conducted an in-depth analysis of social networks using various monitoring and research tools. This study scrutinized online discussions related to anti-Semitism, as well as explicitly anti-Semitic content on social platforms. The approach adopted combined quantitative aspects, by examining discussion volumes, and qualitative aspects, by analyzing the nature of the expressions and interactions observed.

Finally, the data collected was put into perspective with SPCJ statistics, media coverage of the subject and testimonies from associations.

#### Contents

## Part 1: Antisemitism in France: between national awareness and heightened concern among French Jews

- A perceived worsening of anti-Semitism
- Hatred of Israel, the primary perceived cause of anti-Semitism

Young people a little more receptive to legitimizing anti-Semitic acts against a backdrop of change generational relationship with Israel

## Part 2: Dynamics of anti-Semitic ideas in the French population in 2024: prejudices stable but on the rise in certain categories of the population

- Anti-Semitic ideas are not increasing in the French population, but remain widespread
- Young people a little more receptive to the legitimization of anti-Semitic acts against a backdrop of
  - generational evolution in the relationship with Israel
- Antisemitism among Muslims: Prejudice on the rise among a population with diverse relations with Jews
- Political extremes and anti-Semitism: a fertile breeding ground

## Part 3: French Jews and anti-Semitism

- Multiple, protean attacks
- Significant proportion of French Jews victims of anti-Semitic acts since October 7
- The problem of schools and universities
- The question of social networks
- French Jews since October 7: between fear, isolation and reaffirmation of identity

## Part 4: Anti-Semitism in 2024, a political issue


- On social networks, the far left and far right mobilize on the subject of anti-Semitism
- France Insoumise is perceived by French Jews as the political force that contributes most to the rise of anti-Semitism

#### Conclusion

## Part 1: Antisemitism in France: between national awareness and heightened concern among French Jews

### A perceived worsening of anti-Semitism


Six months after the attack on October 7, and in a context where acts of hatred against Jews have risen sharply, anti-Semitism is more than ever perceived as widespread by the French. 76% believe that the phenomenon is present in France, a proportion 12 points higher than that recorded in 2022. This observation, already shared by 85% of French Jews in the previous survey, is now shared by 92% (+7 points). It should also be noted that 53% of French Jews even answer that it is "quite" widespread, a proportion also on the rise (+12 points).



The feeling that anti-Semitism is widespread


These results come against a backdrop of a sharp increase in anti-Semitic acts, but also of significant media coverage and real political mobilization around this subject. An analysis of the number of mentions on social networks shows that the terms "anti-Semites" and "anti-Semitism" were cited 1,030,438 times in 2023, an average of 2,823 times a day. 53% of mentions were recorded after October 7, over a period of less than three months. The peak in mentions occurred around the time of the anti-Semitism march. A closer analysis of content shows that a very large number of publications aim to denounce or report on anti-Semitic acts. While part of this phenomenon bears witness to a probable political instrumentalization of the subject - we'll come back to this point - it also says something about the actual mobilization to publicize the scale of the problem.

#### Change in volume of mentions of anti-Semitism and/or anti-Zionism



#### Hatred of Israel is the primary perceived cause of anti-Semitism

In 2022, hatred of Israel was already identified by respondents from both samples as the main cause of anti-Semitism. While this reason is still cited first by a third of French people, it is now cited by almost one in two people of the Jewish faith (49%, +14 points) and 73% overall (taking into account the first and second causes cited). Islamist ideas are also widely advanced in both samples. A notable difference between the two populations is that people of the Jewish faith are much more likely to cite "extreme left-wing ideas" as the 2nd cause of anti-Semitism. Lastly, far-right ideas are cited by only 10% of French Jews overall, and 4% first.



#### The perceived cause of anti-Semitism

## Part 2: Dynamics of anti-Semitic ideas in the French population: prejudices that are stable but on the rise in certain categories of the population

## Anti-Semitic ideas are not increasing in the French population, but remain widespread

Beyond the perception of the phenomenon, this X-ray also aims to measure the prevalence of anti-Semitic ideas and opinions in the French population, and their possible progression or regression over time. Analysis of the survey results shows that the upsurge in anti-Semitic acts in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas is not accompanied by a spread of anti-Semitic ideas among the French population. The proportion of those surveyed adhering to these prejudices remains unchanged from 2022, although a significant minority continue to subscribe to them. Similarly, the assertion of antipathy towards Jews remains in the minority (6% vs. 5% in 2022). Just as the Coronavirus crisis was not accompanied by an increase in anti-Semitic opinions, the conflict between Israel and Hamas is not reflected in their spread among the population. On the other hand, anti-Semitism is on the rise among the Muslim population, a point we'll come back to in a moment.

In addition to the individual analysis of responses, this year we adopted a *clustering* approach to segment the French population according to several criteria: level of adherence to prejudice, tolerance of anti-Semitic acts, and perceptions of the Jewish population. The method involved two main stages. The first stage involved an exploratory factor analysis, which isolated 18 groups of highly correlated responses. These 18 factors offer a comprehensive and diversified representation of the opinions collected. The second stage used hierarchical clustering analysis to group respondents into the most homogeneous clusters possible. This technique highlights a hierarchy of variables and illustrates how respondents are grouped according to the similarities of their opinions. The aim of this analysis is to categorize responses objectively, based on the opinions expressed by participants.

This method enabled us to segment the population into five groups:

- First group (17% of the French population): This group does not subscribe to any anti-Semitic prejudices and considers all the anti-Semitic acts tested as unacceptable, such as jokes about the Shoah, threats to individuals supporting Israel, or tags on synagogues. Members of this group also express sympathy for Jews.
- Second group (27% of the population): People in this group have no anti-Semitic prejudices and find the same anti-Semitic acts unacceptable as the first group. However, they express indifference towards Jews. Together with the first group, this represents 44% of French people who reject any anti-Semitic prejudice and disapprove of the acts tested.

- Third group (22% of the population): This group displays a low level of anti-Semitism. It includes individuals who may occasionally adhere to a prejudice but consider all acts as unacceptable, or those who find it acceptable to make jokes about the Shoah while not subscribing to any prejudice.
- Fourth group (24% of the population): Characterized by a high level of adherence to anti-Semitic prejudice, members of this group do not, however, condone violent acts. Although steeped in prejudice, they condemn anti-Semitic acts.
- Fifth group (10% of the population): This group is characterized by strong adherence to anti-Semitic prejudice and tolerance of violence. We consider this group to be the most clearly anti-Semitic.

Applying this classification, we find that 44% of French people show no signs of anti-Semitism. A further 22% appear to be generally free of anti-Semitism, although some of their attitudes may occasionally display ambivalence. Finally, 34% of French people show anti-Semitic tendencies, including a sub-group of 10% who show both a strong attachment to prejudice against Jews and tolerance of anti-Semitic violence. It is complex to determine precisely who is anti-Semitic from survey responses alone, and this classification does not claim to be exhaustive. However, it does offer a useful perspective for analyzing the preponderance of certain segments of the population with anti-Semitic attitudes, as we shall see.

# Young people a little more open to the legitimization of anti-Semitic acts against a backdrop of


## generational evolution in the relationship with Israel

The upsurge in anti-Semitic incidents on campuses in both North America and Europe raises questions about the existence in the West of a segment of young people who, while claiming to be anti-Zionist, may in fact be promoting anti-Semitic ideas. This debate is highly complex. There is indeed an area of ambiguity between the expression of what may be legitimate indignation at Israel's policies, and the slide towards attitudes which, under the guise of anti-Zionism, take on an exclusionary, even violent dimension. We shall therefore endeavor to be rigorous and nuanced in our analysis, without falling into the easy trap of fantasizing about a youth that would give in entirely to the sirens of wokism and cancel culture.

As part of this study, we asked French people to indicate which ethnic or religious group they thought was the most widespread victim of violent acts in France. 52% of respondents said Jews (50%), ahead of Muslims (19%), Catholics (15%), Blacks (10%) and Roma (4%). Analysis of the results according to the age of the respondent highlights a major generational effect. While 76% of the over-75s cite Jews, this proportion falls to just 27% among the under-25s, and the decline is linear with age.

## The feeling that Jews are the ethnic or religious group that is the most important in the world.

more victims of violent acts in France "The Jews" Detailed results by age



In our view, this result testifies to a fairly spectacular change in representations. Socialized after the Second World War, the over-75s still remember anti-Semitic persecution and the Holocaust, while the under-25s are more distant and more often unaware. Of course, this result also testifies to a fair sensitivity in the younger generations to the violence objectively suffered by people of color, but it also perhaps says something about a youth that, consciously or not, finds it hard to see Jews as victims. A number of observers at the November 12 march against anti-Semitism noted the low presence of young people in the processions. It should also be noted that analysis of opinion polls on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reveals a major generations, the Hebrew state is perceived more as a colonial power by the young. This phenomenon is not confined to France, but can be observed in most of the major Western democracies. Finally, it should be noted that while only 6% of French people express sympathy for Hamas, this proportion rises to 14% among the under-35s, compared with just 2% of the over-65s.

We analyzed the distribution of the 18-24 and 25-34 age groups within our five classified groups. Among young people under 25, 37% fall into the two groups with anti-Semitic tendencies, a figure comparable to the proportion observed in the French population as a whole, which stands at 34%. However, it is notable that this age group is under-represented in group 4, "Non-violent prejudices" (13% vs. 24% for the French as a whole), but over-represented in group 5, "Prejudices tolerant of violence" (24% vs. 10% for the French as a whole). A similar phenomenon is observed among 25-34 year-olds, where 20% belong to group 4 and 23% to group 5. In other words, 43% of this age group belong to one of the two groups with anti-Semitic tendencies, making them the most over-represented age category within these groups. There is thus an over-representation of young people in group 5, which can be explained by a higher level of tolerance to violence. Group 5 is male (67% men) and young (58% under 35, whereas this age group accounts for 25% of the French population). Group 4, on the other hand, has a fairly balanced sex ratio.

(51% men; 49% women, i.e. a very slight over-representation of men, who account for 48% of the population) and a slightly higher average age, linked to an under-representation of the under-25s and a slight over-representation of the over-65s (32% vs. 25% in the population as a whole). In their study entitled "Une jeunesse plurielle" (plural youth), Olivier Galland and Marc Lazar highlighted the increased propensity of young people to tolerate violence. This observation could explain why individuals under 35 are over-represented in group 5. It's reasonable to assume that this phenomenon is associated with age, and that these individuals will move on to other groups as they age. On the other hand, it is likely that the differences observed in the relationship to Israel and to Jews are the result of a generational difference.

## Antisemitism among Muslims: Prejudice on the rise in a population with diverse relations with Jews

The results of the study reveal an increase in anti-Semitic prejudice among the Muslim population, a group already identified by several studies as having a high level of adherence to these ideas. There was a significant increase in four anti-Semitic statements:

"Jews have too much power in the media" (59% support, +5 points vs. 2022), "Jews have too much power in politics (55%, +13 points), "Jews today use their own status as victims of Nazi genocide (56%, +14 points)" and "Jews are responsible for many economic crises" (34%, +10 points). Although the conflict between Israel and Hamas has not led to an increase in prejudice among the French population as a whole, it does seem to act as a catalyst to reinforce anti-Semitic ideas among certain segments of the Muslim population, who identify more strongly with the Palestinian cause.



## Adherence to various statements about Jews Developments since 2022

A survey carried out by IFOP for the <sup>JDD1</sup> in December 2023 showed that people of the Muslim faith were more inclined to feel sympathy for the Palestinian Authority (53% vs. 10% in the French population as a whole), Hamas (19% vs. 3%), and the Palestinian Authority (53% vs. 10%).

<sup>1</sup> Internet survey of 802 people, representative of the Muslim population. resident in mainland France. Land from December 15 to 22, 2023. antipathy for Israel (39% versus 15%). 45% of those polled also felt that Hamas's actions were resistance actions (an opinion shared by only 10% of French people), compared with 29% for terrorist acts and 26% for war crimes. Lastly, they felt more widely that the authorities and the media were on Israel's side.

We also analyzed the distribution of Muslims in our five clusters. Two-thirds are in our two anti-Semitic clusters (66%), making them the most widely present segment in both. On the other hand, while they are over-represented in cluster 4 (50%), they are not very numerous in cluster 5 (16%). The results of the study thus dispel the notion that the entire population is prone to anti-Semitic violence. It should also be noted that while 16% of Muslims are in group 5, this proportion is close to that observed for practicing Catholics (14%). As in the general population, the Muslims in group 5 tend to be young men, with a strong sense of religiosity, or at least frequent participation in religious and community activities.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that almost a third of Muslims fall into the three groups displaying an absence of anti-Semitic prejudice, which highlights the heterogeneity of positions within this population with regard to Jews.

## Extremes: fertile ground for anti-Semitic ideas

We examined the presence of supporters of the various political parties within the five groups of our classification, paying particular attention to political formations often accused of anti-Semitism. It emerges that La France Insoumise (LFI) sympathizers are particularly over-represented in the two groups with anti-Semitic tendencies: 46% of them can be found there. This phenomenon is even more marked in group 5, which is characterized by adherence to many anti-Semitic prejudices and tolerance of anti-Semitic acts. Indeed, 19% of LFI supporters belong to this group (compared to 10% of the French population).

Our analysis also looked at the distribution of supporters from various far-left and radical-left political movements. Given the dispersion of affiliations and the numerical modesty of certain parties, we consolidated supporters of Lutte Ouvrière, the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA), the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) and La France Insoumise (LFI) into a unified category, representing 13% of the French population. Of these sympathizers, 55% fall into the two categories with an anti-Semitic slant, with a notable 30% in the fifth group, the one characterized by open anti-Semitism and tolerance of violence. On the other hand, EELV supporters are the least over-represented in the two groups with anti-Semitic tendencies, across all political groupings. Only 16% of EELV supporters are present in groups 4 and 5 (and 5% in group 5). Lastly, 23% of PS supporters are in groups 4 and 5, below the national average.

On the far right of the political spectrum, RN sympathizers are also over-represented in the two groups with anti-Semitic tendencies (44%). But only in group 4

The "non-violent prejudices" are more prevalent (35%), while only 9% of them are "non-violent prejudices".


in group 5 (10% of French people). It should also be noted that LR sympathizers are overrepresented in group 4 (39% of sympathizers go to this group) but very little present in group 5 (3%). Finally, LFI, RN and LR sympathizers are indeed over-represented in groups with anti-Semitic tendencies, the difference being in their positioning in each of the two groups. RN and LR sympathizers are more present in group 4, while LFI sympathizers stand out more strongly in group 5.

In conclusion, we can see that our two groups with anti-Semitic tendencies are in fact very different. Group 4 is well-balanced in terms of gender, quite elderly and markedly right-wing and far-right. Group 5, on the other hand, is male, young and very much affiliated with the far left.

### Part 4: French Jews and anti-Semitism

#### Multiple, protean attacks

The results of this new X-ray once again highlight the scale of anti-Semitic acts suffered by French Jews. While three-quarters of those surveyed have already been mocked for being anti-Semitic (73%), more serious incidents are also common. 54% of those questioned had already been insulted because they were Jewish, and 32% had been threatened on social networks. Threats of assault concern a quarter of respondents (24%). Lastly, since 2019, nearly one in five people have reported having been physically attacked (18%). People wearing distinctive religious symbols are more at risk, but the levels recorded among "non-visible" people are also significant. While the latter are less likely to be attacked in the street, they are particularly at risk at school and in the workplace, where their Jewishness may come to light.



In 47% of cases, the aggressor was known, often a classmate, sometimes a neighbor or colleague. Assaults very rarely lead to complaints (14%), even in cases of physical violence (31%). This can be explained by the feeling that legal action will not succeed (43% overall and 61% of victims of physical aggression).


### A quarter of French Jews say they have suffered an anti-Semitic act since October 7

25% of French Jews say they have been the victim of an anti-Semitic act since October 7th, and 12% say it has happened several times. This figure rises to 36% for those who systematically or regularly wear distinctive religious symbols, and 37% for the under-25s. The data we refer to can include a wide range of incidents, from derogatory comments on social networks to outright physical assaults. They are based on self-reporting and therefore sometimes have a subjective dimension. Nevertheless, they suggest that the actual number of anti-Semitic acts is probably much higher than the 1,676 incidents officially recorded by the Ministry of the Interior and the SPCJ. This figure, it should be remembered, is based primarily on complaints filed. However, as we have seen, victims rarely go to police stations. These attacks frequently occur in situations where Jewish and Israeli identities are confused, and where political tensions in the Middle East are used as a pretext, or at least lead to threatening exchanges or acts of violence. In this respect, it is worth noting that 61% of Jewish people say they often or occasionally feel accused or blamed for the actions of the Israeli government.

### The problem of schools and universities

Consistently since 2019, the X-ray results show that schools are the primary place of exposure to anti-Semitic acts. In 2024, 62% of victims said they had been subjected to insults, threats or acts of physical violence in a school. 42% even stated that this had happened on several occasions. The school problem is not new, and for the past twenty years or so, Jewish families have often chosen to send their children to private schools. In our sample, 43% of parents say they have at least one child in a Jewish school, 16% in a Catholic establishment and 4% in a secular private school. In all, 61% of families opt for private schooling. This is a massive phenomenon compared to the data recorded for the general population (18%). While the choice of denominational schools is often dictated by religious aspects (34% of parents cite this reason first, and 50% in total), it is above all a question of safety. 37% of the parents in our sample explained that they had chosen private schools because they felt their child would be safer there, and 69% cited this reason in total.

#### Reasons for private schooling




While incidents at school are not new, SPCJ data show that they have been on the increase since October 7. Between January and September 2023, the number of incidents recorded ranged from 0 to 14, before jumping to 60 in October and 66 in November. The phenomenon is not confined to secondary schools. France Universités reported 67 anti-Semitic acts in higher education establishments, and for several months now Jewish students have been expressing their unease. Young French Jews are more likely to be the victims of anti-Semitic acts: 64% of those under 25 have been insulted, and 31% say they have been threatened. And while a quarter of French Jews say they have been subjected to an anti-Semitic act since October 7, this proportion rises to 37% among the under-25s. It is noteworthy that the opinion justifying attacks against a Jewish person, because of his or her presumed or proven support for the Israeli government, is particularly widespread among young people under 25 within the general population, reaching 35%. At the same time, within the French Jewish community, a significantly higher proportion of people in the same age bracket report being frequently accused or held responsible for the actions of the Israeli government.

#### The feeling of being accused or made responsible for the actions of the Israeli

#### government as a Jew

Focus on young people




In a study carried out by IFOP for UEJF <sup>2</sup> in 2023, 83% of Jewish students surveyed felt that extreme left-wing acts and violence represented a major threat to Jewish students (49% a very major threat), a higher proportion than that observed for extreme right-wing violence (63%). In universities with a strong influence from groups affiliated with the far left, Jewish students often prefer to keep their identity secret for fear of being held accountable for the situation in the Middle East. When they do express a dissonant voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - speaking out about the rapes suffered by Israeli women on October 7, or pointing out that hostages are still being held by Hamas - they come up against a virulent minority.

<sup>2</sup> Internet survey conducted in June 2023 a mong a sample of 237 Jewish students and a sample of 802 Jewish students. people, representative of the student population in France


### The question of social networks

We measured the sense of insecurity felt by French Jews in various places, and compared it with that recorded in the general population. The level of perceived insecurity is slightly higher for French Jews in their neighborhoods (36% vs. 30%) and in cabs and VTCs (38% vs. 31%), but the gap is widest on social networks (54% vs. 39%).



Feelings of insecurity in different places *Results on Total often / From time to time* 


At the same time, we carried out an analysis of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist content on social networks using various monitoring and search tools. The analysis reveals an increase in anti-Semitic content from October 7 onwards, but the level quickly drops back down. Insults and overtly anti-Semitic comments are generally less prevalent online, probably due to the relatively effective moderation of platforms. On the other hand, there has been a spike in very anti-Zionist comments, often characterized by an outrageous tone. A great deal of content refers to Nazism or the Holocaust. Although the volume of anti-Zionist content is substantial, it does not reach an overwhelming proportion. However, it is likely that, influenced by the platforms' algorithms, French Jews find themselves overexposed. Indeed, social networks tend to amplify certain echoes rather than providing a faithful reflection of reality. For example, a Jewish person learning about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on social networks might perceive, through the comments, a wider adherence to radical anti-Zionism, although our results show that only a minority of the population actually supports this position.



October 7, 2023: the tipping point between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism

## French Jews since October 7: between fear, isolation and reaffirmation of identity

Against a backdrop of increasing anti-Semitic acts, but also a heavy atmosphere, French Jews are undeniably living in fear. 86% of those polled said they were more afraid of becoming the victim of an anti-Semitic act since October 7. What's more, 56% said they felt this fear very strongly. Faced with the fear of aggression, some French Jews prefer to conceal their identity. 44% of people wearing distinctive religious symbols say they have stopped wearing them in public spaces since October 7. One in five has removed their Mezuza from outside their home. 16% of those surveyed even claim to have changed their name on delivery apps, for fear that their surname might betray their identity or religion and lead to an attack.



Fear of anti-Semitism since the attack on October 7

While fear has dominated since October 7, the survey results reveal another phenomenon: a reaffirmation of identity. Nearly  $\frac{3}{4}$  of those surveyed say that the October 7 pogrom has strengthened their Zionist convictions (73%) and their Jewish identity (71%). Even more markedly, one in two reported that the event had considerably strengthened these aspects of their identity. This phenomenon reflects a well-documented psycho-sociological mechanism: faced with a traumatic event and the resulting sense of threat, individuals tend to cling more firmly to their group identity. It's worth noting that while this phenomenon is slightly more prevalent among churchgoers (55% "a lot"), it is also present among people who are more distant from religion (40%). It concerns all age groups in equivalent proportions. Even more noteworthy is the fact that while the proportion of French Jews considering leaving France has not changed (52%), we can see that would-be emigrants are primarily considering Israel as a destination (58%), ahead of the USA (15%), Canada (9%), the UK (1%) or another country (16%). This result is all the more noteworthy given that October 7 revealed Israel's vulnerability.


Analysis of our survey reveals another striking phenomenon: a feeling of loneliness widely felt by French Jews. Indeed, 80% of respondents said they had felt loneliness following the events of October 7 and their impact in France, 53% of whom felt it strongly. Scientific research suggests that, in response to aggression, a minority group seeks not only protection, but also clear and indisputable recognition of the violence it has suffered. This feeling of loneliness could therefore be partly due to the reluctance of certain segments of the population to unambiguously condemn the actions of Hamas.

## Part 4: Anti-Semitism in 2024, a political issue

#### On social networks, the far left and far right mobilize on the subject of anti-Semitism

An analysis of discussions on social networks shows that elected representatives and activists at the two extremes of the political spectrum are the most vocal on the subject of anti-Semitism. For example, 56% of comments were made by those on the extreme right, 35% by those on the radical left or extreme left, compared with just 4% for the presidential majority, 3% for the left and 2% for the right.

## Elected representatives and activists from the far-right sphere are proving to be the most active and viral online on the subject of anti-Semitism.




Among the people who have expressed their views on the subject in 2023, we find those who are more right-wing or far-right: Jean Messiha, Bruno Attal, Gilbert Collard and Julien Odoul. But we also find personalities from France insoumise: Thomas Portes, Antoine Léaument and Manuel Bompard. Far-right personalities - members of the RN or of reconquête - express their concern about the rise in anti-Semitism. A phenomenon they link to Islamic fundamentalism. Political recuperation or sincere indignation? It's impossible to answer that question. On the other hand, members of La France insoumise criticize what they perceive as the misuse of the accusation of anti-Semitism. In their view, this is aimed at suppressing criticism of Israel's actions in Gaza. They also denounce what they see as unjustified accusations against them.

| Prises de paroles des personnalités<br>politiques par nombre de publications<br>ANTISÉMITISME ANTISIONISME |       |                            |       |
|--|-------|----------------------------|-------|
| Comptes  | Posts | Comptes                    | Posts |
| Jean MESSIHA   | 199   | Caroline YADAN             | 12    |
| Bruno ATTAL  | 132   | Meyer HABIB                | 5     |
| Meyer HABIB  | 111   | Thomas PORTES              | 3     |
| Thomas PORTES  | 100   | Jean MESSIHA               | 3     |
| Fabrice DI VIZIO   | 96    | Julien ODOUL               | 2     |
| Françoise CASTEX   | 92    | Françoise CASTEX           | 2     |
| Gilbert COLLARD  | 78    | Frederic FALCON            | 2     |
| Caroline YADAN   | 69    | Georges ABITBOL            | 2     |
| Julien ODOUL   | 57    | Jean-Philippe TANGUY       | 2     |
| Antoine LÉAUMENT   | 54    | Deborah ABISROR - DE LIEME | 1     |
| Valérie BOYER  | 46    | Yannick LEVEQUE            | 1     |
| Manuel BOMPARD   | 44    | Franck ALLISIO             | 1     |
| Arnaud LE GALL   | 42    | Philippe DE VILLIERS       | 1     |
| Olivier FAURE  | 36    | François ASSELINEAU        | 1     |
| Manon AUBRY  | 35    | Manuel BOMPARD             | 1     |
| Hadrien CLOUET   | 35    | Kevin BOSSUET              | 1     |
| Anthony SMITH  | 34    | Julien LAFARGUETTE         | 1     |
| Ersilia SOUDAIS  | 30    | Matthieu LOUVES            | 1     |
| Adrien QUATENNENS  | 28    | Aurore BERGÉ               | 1     |
| Nadège ABOMANGOLI  | 25    | Fabrice DI VIZIO           | 1     |
| Taha BOUHAFS   | 19    | Amine EL-KHATMI            | 1     |
| Deborah ABISROR - DE LIEME   | 18    | Philippe DERVAUX           | 1     |
| Jordan BARDELLA  | 18    | Taha BOUHAFS               | 1     |
| Frederic FALCON  | 18    | Arnaud LE GALL             | 1     |
| Mathilde PANOT   | 18    | Damien RIEU                | 1     |

The political figures who have expressed themselves most often on the subject of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are most often at the extremes of the political spectrum.

## France insoumise is seen as the formation contributing most to the rise of anti-Semitism


For several years now, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and certain France insoumise figures have been cultivating ambiguous language vis-à-vis anti-Semitism. The "disenchantment" between French Jews and LFI is long-standing, but seems to have reached a point of no return since October 7. The refusal to explicitly condemn the crimes of Hamas provoked outrage. Against this backdrop, 92% of French Jews believe that France insoumise is contributing to the rise of anti-Semitism in France, with 82% even answering "yes, absolutely". Rarely has IFOP observed in surveys a proportion of The number of "yes, absolutely" responses is also high. To a much lesser extent, the other NUPES parties are also incriminated: 60% of French Jews cite EELV (but only 30% "yes, absolutely") and 43% mention the PS. The RN is less frequently mentioned than LFI and EELV, but this does not give it a blank cheque: one out of two Jews believes it contributes to the rise in anti-Semitism. France insoumise is also cited by one in two of the general population (53%).



## The feeling that different political formations contribute to anti-Semitism

Even more strikingly, we asked respondents in both samples whether they would leave France if an LFI or RN candidate were elected in 2027. The proportion of French Jews answering "yes" in the event of the election of a member of the far-right party is slightly higher than the general population (30% vs. 21%). The difference is spectacular if an LFI candidate is elected (57% vs. 19%).

The propensity to leave France if an RN or LFI candidate is elected Total Yes



#### Conclusion

The results of this study reveal the tangible impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the central event of October 7 on the rise of anti-Semitism in France. In a climate where 61% of French citizens of the Jewish faith say they are sometimes held responsible for events in the Middle East, a quarter of them say they have experienced an anti-Semitic act since October 7. Fear of aggression is widespread.

At a time when young French Jews are more likely to be blamed for the actions of the Israeli government, and more likely to be the victims of anti-Semitic acts, it seems hard to deny that there is a problem in some schools. All the more so as general population data show that, against a backdrop of generational change in their relationship with Israel, young people are slightly more inclined to find anti-Semitic acts acceptable. It would be inappropriate to criminalize young people in the West who show support for the Palestinian cause. However, it is crucial to remain vigilant in the face of expressions of anti-Zionism so radical that they can exclude or marginalize Jewish students. It's important to remember that Zionism is an integral part of Jewish identity. Although there are anti-Zionist Jews, the vast majority of Jews support the existence of Israel and are attached to this idea.

Domestic aliyah, development of religious establishments, departure for Israel: for the past 20 years, in the face of anti-Semitism and in an increasingly archipelagic society, some French Jews have been unwillingly seceding. Sadly, the results of this study suggest that the current period is likely to see a further withdrawal. The predictable response of a minority faced with violence. In 2024, the republican ideal of a fraternal society united in diversity has never seemed so difficult to achieve.

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