Erdogan vs. the "Crusaders"

This article was written by Col. (Ret.) Dr. Eran Lerman

Executive Summary: The recent referendum in Turkey called by President Erdogan gave unprecedented powers to the office of the president. Although the vote margin was small and the result still in dispute, it raises the real possibility of the Turkish government turning in an alarmingly authoritarian direction. By weakening democratic norms it may lead Turkey away from the West and its values, and towards some form of Islamist fundamentalism. Yet Eran Lerman notes that many who voted to support the change did so not out of ideological motives, but because they are grateful to Erdogan for improvements in their economic conditions under his leadership, and they may have little enthusiasm for drastic change. Mr. Lerman suggests several diplomatic and economic steps that the West should employ to moderate Turkish behavior in the wake of the referendum.

The victory of the "Evet" (yes) vote in the referendum in Turkey was narrow—only 51.4% supported the dramatic constitutional change that President Erdogan is seeking, and even that number is hotly disputed by the opposition parties, which are looking for ways to force a recount. Nevertheless, it may mark a turning point in the history of the 90-year-old Turkish Republic. On the realistic assumption that the results will hold, and Erdogan's grip on power will indeed tighten, the challenge now—for Turks and for outsiders alike—is to prevent this from worsening the already problematic relationship between Turkey and her neighbors, and from locking Erdogan and his colleagues into an anti-Western course of action.

Whatever severe doubts have been raised as to the veracity of the results, President Erdogan perceives the referendum as a mandate to establish a presidential system of government that would give him broad authority and secure his hold on power for years to come. It would certainly make him the most influential leader of his country since Ataturk, whose secularist legacy he has been steadily undoing for the last twelve years. While his title would be "President of the Republic," not of Turkey as such (somehow preserving the republican ideal), this would be in fact an American-style chief executive position, without a prime minister in an intermediate position, as in the presidential model in Russia, France, and most of the Arab republics. Erdogan’s grip on the judiciary and other instruments of state may hasten the consolidation of what many see as an increasingly authoritarian regime in Turkey.

Equally worrisome for those of us who still hope to see Turkey rejoin the community of Western-style democracies was Erdogan's use of language after the campaign ended: he spoke of the outcome as a victory over the Christian "crusaders" who allegedly tried to intervene in internal Turkish affairs. Earlier, he described the Dutch and German governments as the true inheritors of the Nazi mindset because they blocked his party's ministers and activists from addressing crowds of Turkish immigrants from their countries in rallies favoring the "yes" vote. (Turkish immigrants abroad still have voting rights in Turkey; a majority supported Erdogan—but not Turks in the UK and U.S., who were overwhelmingly opposed.)

This wild Islamist terminology may indicate greater trouble yet to come. There seem to be diminishing prospects of Turkey reengaging with Europe: the re-institution of the death penalty, which Erdogan seeks to use against those who instigated the failed military coup this summer, may be the straw that will break this particular camel's back. Not surprisingly, a prominent Turkish journalist has recently repeated a famous saying about Turkey being a ship "sailing east," even if some of the liberals on board are running towards the west.

With the power to undo more and more of Ataturk's choices, will Erdogan make his country a neo-Ottoman base of support for the Muslim Brotherhood variant of radical Islamist totalitarianism? Are we going to see greater efforts to meddle in Libya, attack the regime in Egypt, and use religious foundations to challenge both Israeli and Jordanian policies in Jerusalem? Can we expect renewed efforts to support Hamas? Will Erdogan's expanded authority also lead to more aggressive policies towards Cyprus, Greece—and Israel? The future of the Eastern Mediterranean hangs in the balance, and it should come as no surprise that all who share these concerns—in Jerusalem and Athens, Nicosia and Cairo, Amman and Rome—are drawing closer together, establishing new structures of strategic cooperation.

Nevertheless, radicalization and a broadening chasm with the West are not inevitable results of the referendum. Those who voted "yes" did not necessarily see themselves as confirming Erdogan's regional and international stance: if indeed there was a narrow majority in favor, this reflected his popularity among a large number of people for whom his leadership, and AKP power, have been the ticket to rise out of poverty and deprivation in the shantytowns ("gecekondus") that sprang up in the previous generation around Istanbul, Ankara, and other major cities. AKP offered them the prospect of a better economic future, and to an impressive extent, delivered on this promise, a fact that goes a long way towards explaining the party's political grip on much of the country.

To sustain this promise, however, Turkey will need to maintain economic growth, attract tourism and investment, and chart policies that "lift all boats." Despite Erdogan's proud slogans, this cannot be done if Turkey embarks on a course of confrontation with its main business partners in the West. Israeli experience, in this respect, is telling: even at height of the crisis over the Mavi Marmara, with diplomatic relations dramatically degraded and Erdogan growling loudly that he might take military measures, trade between the two countries—which benefits many in those classes of Turkish society that AKP relies on for support—was never allowed to falter: in fact, it doubled. Well before the reconciliation agreement, measures were taken by Israel that made Haifa into an important port for the Arab world's trade with Turkey. Clearly, Erdogan knows all too well that a strategy that harms trade and business interests will also hurt his own standing.

Moreover, the map of the referendum results—even according to the government version of the outcome—reveals that the main urban centers of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, as well as the areas along the coast for which tourism is vital, tended to vote "No." It is possible, of course, for the president to repress such dissent and take strong measures against his critics. And yet over time, it is not easy to govern a country if resources are running low and there is little support from the political classes in the areas that constitute the economic and cultural core of the country.

This problem could become more acute if government policies lead not only to economic isolation but also to military entanglements and a growing alienation from former allies. It is therefore useful to bear in mind that Erdogan himself has shown a capacity for rational, even cynical, calculation, and that there are voices of reason and sobriety within AKP. Our response to the challenge posed by the situation in Turkey should therefore encompass the following six strategic elements:

1. Upholding a principled position on the Muslim Brotherhood ideology as a totalitarian abomination, and on Hamas as a terror organization. The message to Ankara should be succinct and clear: your legitimacy will be measured by your positions on democracy and on terror.
2. Sustaining a system of carrot-and-stick leverage in the economic realm, which is particularly relevant for Europe, Turkey's main trade partner. Pragmatism should be met by pragmatism and by growing economic integration; radicalization—by the flight of investment and of tourism, including the loss of Istanbul's current status as an air-traffic hub. There are good alternatives, and Turkey's options for responding are rather limited.
3. Finding ways, despite the lack of procedures for ousting a member, to make Turkey's place in NATO increasingly dependent upon the country's strategic orientation. Continuing to shelter and assist terrorist organizations, designated as such (in the case of Hamas) by all but two of the Alliance members, cannot be compatible with "normal" membership and with access to NATO intelligence-sharing.
4. Striking a carefully designed balance on the Kurdish question, as the KRG (the Kurdish de-facto state in northern Iraq) moves closer to a referendum of its own—on independence—and Syrian Kurds play a major role in the battle to destroy ISIL in Raqqa. There are legitimate Turkish concerns, as Ankara cannot accept a Kurdish state all along Turkey's southern border, from Iran to the Mediterranean, but it is also necessary to support a robust and independent Kurdish entity in both Iraq and Syria as a pro-Western ally of value in a volatile region.
5. Bolstering cooperation among other key Mediterranean players, in a strong but flexible format that could be adjusted to include Turkey if and when it makes the right choices. The already emerging tripartite structures—Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Greece, Cyprus, Egypt—as well as a more prominent Italian role could be the building blocks of a new regional security concept in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. The U.S., too, should learn to think and act in terms of the "East Med" rather than the "Mid-East" as the relevant frame of reference.
6. Finally, while all this needs to be done, it is also important to cultivate channels of communication with Erdogan himself and with key elements within AKP. With former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu gone, some of the ideological fervor may have gone with him, leaving room for more pragmatic policies (such as the compromise with Israel, when Erdogan gave up on his previous demand that Israel should "lift the siege on Gaza.")

Whatever happens, Turkey will remain the largest economy, the most populous nation, and overall, despite severe erosion in command and morale, the strongest military power in the eastern Mediterranean. It is important to do whatever can be done to avoid alienating Ankara any further, as too much is at stake. A sturdy business-oriented interaction is certainly a useful check on radical tendencies. Yet ultimately, the choices are Erdogan's to make. As his policies evolve and the implementation of his constitutional revolution unfolds over time, there is much left to be done. The "roadmap" above can help determine how to react to his decisions.

Eran Lerman is the former deputy for foreign policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office. Prior to that, he served as director of AJC Jerusalem.